This is a reply to Cees Maris. He wrote two articles in Dutch purporting to be a dialogue with Mogobe Ramose. The two articles have subsequently been compressed into one and published in the South African Journal of Philosophy. Mogobe’s reply is directed at all three articles, meaning the two published in Dutch together with the one published in English. The core of the argument is the meaning of ubu-ntu against ubuntu. The former is a philosophical concept and the latter (...) is the everyday language usage presupposing but not explicitly manifesting awareness of its reliance upon ubu-ntu. In elaborating upon his criticism of some of the writings of Mogobe on “ubuntu”, Maris appeals to other writers to support his position. Mogobe dismisses all this on the ground that neither Maris nor his supporters actually address and challenge the philosophical exposition of ubu-ntu in the various writings of Mogobe. Maris and his supporters have at best looked at Ramose but have not seen him. The result is that there never was “a dialogue” with Ramose, except the imaginary one by Maris. (shrink)

The sheer variety of socio-political events and technological advancements which affect modern society, and the speed and intensity at which these events occur around the world, delivers change known as epistemic and social transformation. Within this context, the question of justice for all is a poignant one. It is a cognitive revolution challenging humankind to consider whether or not the already contested meaning of philosophy can remain unchanged. The contributions to _Contrasts and contests about philosophy_ address this challenge from a (...) variety of different, and even contending, perspectives. This book was originally published as a special issue of the _South African Journal of Philosophy. _. (shrink)

Professor Heinz Kimmerle encountered African philosophy at a time when his specialisation in the philosophy of Hegel had attained world recognition. For Hegel, African philosophy did not exist in Sub-Saharan Africa, exactly the area in which Kimmerle made his first contact with African philosophy. Hegel’s philosophy was not a stranger to Sub-Saharan Africa. This was because the Western educational paradigm was imposed upon the conquered, colonized peoples during the period of colonisation. Unlike Hegel, Kimmerle took African philosophy seriously and engaged, (...) initially, in dialogues with African philosophy. Out of the unfolding dialogues grew intercultural philosophy spearheaded by Kimmerle’s penetrating, insightful and incisive critique of some of the fundamental presuppositions of Hegel’s philosophy. The essays contained in this book focus on the evolution of Kimmerle’s conception and meaning of intercultural philosophy. Underlying this are recognition and respect for other modes of doing philosophy as manifestations of intercultural philosophy. To deny dialogues, if you prefer, polylogue among world philosophies, is to reject the very basis of philosophy. Thus a crucial dimension of philosophy would be precluded, which can be found in this book, namely, the critical evaluation of Kimmerle’s conception and meaning of intercultural philosophy. (shrink)